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ABSTRACT 
The prominence of the place of cloud computing in future converged networks is incontestable. This is due to the obvious 
advantages of the cloud as a medium of storage with ubiquity of access platforms and minimal hardware requirements on 
the user end. Secure delivery of data to and from the cloud is however a serious issue that needs to be addressed. We present 
in this paper the security issues affecting cloud computing and propose the use of homomorphic encryption as a panacea for 
dealing with these serious security concerns vis-à-vis the access to cloud data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
 Cloud computing as a concept is the result of the 
natural evolution of our everyday approach to using 
technology delivered via the Internet. Cloud computing 
came into the foreground as a result of advances in 
virtualization (e.g. VMWare) [1], distributed computing 
with server clusters (e.g. Google) [2] and increase in the 
availability of broadband Internet access. Industry leaders 
describe cloud computing simply as the delivery of 
applications or IT services, which are provided by a third 
party over the Internet (Rackspace, Microsoft, IBM) [3, 4, 
5]. Ironically, the recent global economic recession served 
as a booster for interest in cloud computing technologies as 
organizations sought for ways to reduce 
their IT budget, while keeping up with 
performance and profits [6]. The cloud 
computing buzz began in 2006 with the 
launch of Amazon EC2, gaining traction 
in 2007 as seen in the Figure 1.  
 The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology defines cloud 
computing as follows: “Cloud computing 
is a model for enabling convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool 
of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider 
interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is 
composed of five essential characteristics, three service 
models, and four deployment models.” [7] 
 Cloud computing is currently characterized by 
having an on demand access to elastic resources via a 
tenancy model. It typifies the holy grail of no-worries in 
computing, allowing a company to focus on its core 
business, paying for all its IT resources as a service.  
 The rest of the paper is divided into the following 
sections. Section II describes the three major cloud 
computing service models. In section III we present the four 
cloud computing deployment models vis-à-vis infrastructure 
ownership. The main thrust of this paper – cloud computing 
security issues is introduced in section IV, while 
homomorphic encryption is discussed in sections V, VI and 
VII. The paper concludes in section VIII by proposing a 
novel approach of adding an encryption layer on top of the 
encrypted files to be stored on the cloud.  
2. CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICE MODELS
 In cloud computing, everything is delivered as a 
Service (XaaS), from testing and security, to collaboration 
and metamodeling [8]. The cloud was rapidly becoming a 
conflagration of buzzwords “as a service”. Today there are 
three main service models, which are agreed on and defined 
in the NIST document [9]. 
 
Figure 1: Search and News Volume for Cloud Computing as at April 2011 
[Source: Google Trends] 
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1. Software as a Service {SaaS} - this simply means 
delivering software over the Internet. It is the most widely 
known model of cloud computing. SaaS has been around 
since early 2001 when it was commonly referred to as the 
Application Service Provider (ASP) Model [8]. Software as 
a Service consists of software running on the provider’s 
cloud infrastructure, delivered to (multiple) clients (on-
demand) via a thin client (e.g. browser) over the Internet. 
Typical examples are Google Docs and Salesforce.com 
CRM. 
2. Platform as a Service {PaaS} - this gives a client 
(developer) the flexibility to build (develop, test and deploy) 
applications on the provider’s platform (API, storage and 
infrastructure). PaaS stakeholders include the PaaS hoster 
who provides the infrastructure (servers etc), the PaaS 
provider who provides the development tools and platform 
and the PaaS user [10]. Examples of PaaS are Microsoft 
Azure and Google AppEngine. 
3. Infrastructure as a Service {IaaS} - rather than buy 
servers and build a datacenter from ground up, and 
consequently having to worry about what happens when the 
website hits a million users, IaaS offers users elastic on-
demand access to resources (networking, servers and 
storage), which could be accessed via a service API. The 
underlying infrastructure is transparent to the end user, 
while s/he retains control over the platform and software 
running on the infrastructure. IaaS runs on a tenancy model, 
which employs a usage-based payment approach allowing 
users to pay for only those resources they actually use. 
3. CLOUD COMPUTING EPLOYMENT
MODELS
 Depending on infrastructure ownership, there are 
four deployment models of cloud computing each with its 
merits and demerits. This is where the security issues start. 
1. The Public Cloud - this is the traditional view of cloud 
computing in every day lingua. It is usually owned by a 
large organization (e.g. Amazon’s EC2, Google’s 
AppEngine and Microsoft’s Azure). The owner-organisation 
makes its infrastructure available to the general public via a 
multi-tenant model on a self-service basis delivered over the 
Internet. This is the most cost-effective model leading to 
substantial savings for the user, albeit with attendant privacy 
and security issues since the physical location of the 
provider’s infrastructure usually traverses numerous national 
boundaries. 
2. The Private Cloud - refers to cloud infrastructure in a 
single tenant environment. It defers from the traditional 
datacenter in its predominant use of virtualization. It may be 
managed by the tenant organization or by a third party 
within or outside the tenant premises. A private cloud costs 
more than the public cloud, but it leads to more cost savings 
when compared with a datacenter as evidenced by Concur 
Technologies (est. savings of $7million in 3 years from 
2009) [11]. The private cloud gives an organization greater 
control over its data and resources. As a result, the private 
cloud is more appealing to enterprises especially in mission 
and safety critical organizations. 
3. The Community Cloud - according to NIST, the 
community cloud refers to a cloud infrastructure shared by 
several organizations within a specific community. It may 
be managed by any one of the organizations or a third 
party. A typical example is the Open Cirrus Cloud 
Computing Testbed, which is a collection of Federated data 
centers across six sites spanning from North America to 
Asia [12]. 
 
Figure 2: Cloud Computing Service Models 
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4. The Hybrid Cloud - comprises of a combination of any 
two (or all) of the three models discussed above. 
Standardization of APIs has lead to easier distribution of 
applications across different cloud models. This enables 
newer models such as “Surge Computing” in which 
workload spikes from the private cloud is offset to the 
public cloud. A comparison of the different issues of cloud 
computing vis-à-vis deployment models is given in Table 1. 
4. SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD
COMPUTING
 Security has always been the main issue for IT 
Executives when it comes to cloud adoption. In two surveys 
carried out by IDC in 2008 [14] and 2009 [15] respectively, 
security came top on the list (see Figure 3). However, cloud 
computing is an agglomeration of technologies, operating 
systems, storage, networking, virtualization, each fraught 
with inherent security issues. For example, browser based 
attacks, denial of service attacks and network intrusion 
become carry over risks into cloud computing. There are 
potentials for a new wave of large-scale attacks via the 
virtualization platform. Chow et al. [16] described the “Fear 
of the Cloud” by categorizing security concerns into three 
traditional concerns, availability and third party data control. 
Research firm Gartner [17] posited seven security risks 
ranging from data location and segregation to recovery and 
long-term viability. The European Network and Information 
Security Agency [18] also published a list of 35 issues in 
cloud computing in 4 categories. Organizations such as 
ISACA and Cloud Security Alliance publish guidelines and 
best practices to mitigate the security issues in the cloud [19, 
20]. 
 Before delving into all the security ills of cloud 
computing, worthy of note are some of the cloud security 
advantages, which were pointed out by Peter Mell and Tim 
Grance of NIST in [21]. The cloud offers data redundancy - 
through automated replication and simpler auditing - due to 
cloud homogeneity. Cloud companies are also able to afford 
a dedicated security team and invest more in security 
infrastructure. Other benefits noted in [18] include rapid 
smart scaling of resources, standardized security interfaces 
and an overall benefit of scale (security measures are 
cheaper on a large scale). Some of the pressing security 
issues in cloud computing include: 
1. Availability - This borders on data being available 
whenever it is required. This is one of the prime concerns of 
mission and safety critical organizations. Availability 
concerns also extend to the need to migrate to another 
provider, uptime periods of current provider or long-term 
viability of the cloud provider as noted in [16, 17]. Some 
well-known outages of leading cloud providers are shown in 
Table 2. 
TABLE 2: CLOUD SERVICE OUTAGES 
Cloud Service Outage 
Duration
Dates
Google Gmail  30 hours Oct. 16-17, 2008 [22] 
Google Gmail, Apps  24 hours Aug. 11, 2008 [23] 
Windows Azure  22 hours Mar. 13-14, 2009 [24]
FlexiScale  18 hours Oct. 31, 2008 [25] 
Amazon S3  7 hours Jul. 20, 2008 [26] 
Salesforce.com  40 minutes Jan. 6, 2009 [27] 
 
2. Data Security - This risk stems primarily from loss of 
physical, personnel and logical control of data. Issues 
include virtualization vulnerabilities [28], SaaS 
vulnerabilities (e.g. a case in which Google Docs exposed 
private user files) [29], phishing scams [30] and other 
potential data breaches. Other data security risks mentioned 
in [18] include data leakage and interception, economic and 
distributed denial of service and loss of encryption keys. 
Unique risks also arise due to the multi-tenancy and 
resource-sharing models as pointed out in [17, 18, 20, 31]. 
The inability to fully segregate data or isolate separate users 
can lead to undesired exposure of confidential data in the 
investigation of a situation involving co-tenants. 
Hypervisor vulnerabilities can also be leveraged to launch 
attacks across tenant accounts. Data containing social and 
national insurance details, health data and financial 
information raise issues about authorization, rights 
management, authentication and access controls. 
 
Figure 3: Top 3 issues with the cloud/on-demand model 
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 Furthermore, Abadi [32] pointed out that it is hard 
to maintain ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation, 
durability) properties of during data replication over large 
geographic zones. Data remembrance or persistence remains 
an issue due to replication and distribution of data even after 
a user has left a cloud provider. A data security lifecycle 
model is shown in Figure 4. 
3. Third-Party Control: this is probably the prime cause of 
concern in the cloud. With the growing value of corporate 
information, third party access can lead to a potential loss of 
intellectual property and trade secrets. There is also the issue 
of a malicious insider who abuses access rights to tenant 
information. The fear of corporate espionage and data 
warfare also stems from third party control. Provider 
compliance with regulations such as those on auditing also 
raise questions on how that can be effected on site in a 
globally distributed multi tenant environment [16]. A 
situation can also arise in which the user becomes locked-in 
to a particular vendor. This can be due to a difficulty in 
migrating data to a new vendor. Other risks might arise from 
the terms of service being obsolete following the merger or 
acquisition of the cloud provider. A final note on prompt 
disaster recovery also arises due to third party data control. 
4. Privacy and Legal Issues - data in the cloud is usually 
globally distributed which raises concerns about jurisdiction, 
data exposure and privacy. Pearson [33] summarized the 
main privacy issues of cloud computing. Users are made to 
give away their personal information without knowing 
where it is stored or what future purpose it might serve. 
Organizations stand a risk of not complying with 
government policies as would be explained further while the 
cloud vendors who expose sensitive information risk legal 
liability. Virtual co-tenancy of sensitive and non-sensitive 
data on the same host also carries its own potential risks. 
Some legal compliance issues in cloud computing include 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. 104-191 which prevents disclosure of 
individually identifiable health information. Similarly, the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 258-263 laid 
regulations requiring notifications of breaches in health data. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338, also has similar requirements with regards to financial 
data. Similarly, the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 
95/46/EC) seeks to secure the privacy and protection of 
personal data. 
5. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
AND ITS POTENTIALS IN THE CLOUD
 If all data (personal, health, financial etc) stored in 
the cloud were encrypted, that would effectively solve issues 
2, 3 and 4. However, a user would be unable to leverage the 
power of the cloud to carry out computation on data without 
first decrypting it, or shipping it entirely back to the user for 
computation. The cloud provider thus has to decrypt the data 
first (nullifying the issue of privacy and confidentiality), 
perform the computation then send the result to the user. 
What if the user could carry out any arbitrary computation 
on the hosted data without the cloud provider learning about 
the user’s data - computation is done on encrypted data 
without prior decryption. This is the promise of 
homomorphic encryption schemes which allow the 
transformation of ciphertexts C(m) of message m, to  
ciphertexts C(f(m)) of a computation/function of message m, 
without disclosing the message.  
 The idea was first suggested by Rivest, Adleman 
and Dertouzos in 1978, referred to as privacy 
homomorphisms [34]. RSA (invented by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman ‘78) [35] had multiplicative homomorphism (you 
could compute a ciphertext which is the product of 
plaintexts)  and over the next 30 years, researchers such as 
Yao ‘82 [36], Goldwasser and Micali ‘82 [37], ElGamal ‘85 
[37 - 38] and Paillier [39] came up with partially 
homomorphic cryptosystems. A survey of homomorphic 
encryption schemes can be found in [40,41].  
An encryption scheme can be said to be fully homomorphic 
if: 
 E m1  ?  m2? ?? E m1? ? ?  E m2? ? ;  ?  m1  ,  m2  ?  M   (1) 
Where M is the set of plaintexts, ?  - represents any 
arbitrary function and ? means computation is done 
without the plaintexts being decrypted. 
 The first fully homomorphic encryption system 
was proposed by Craig Gentry in 2009 [42] using ideal 
lattices. Gentry’s approach employed devising a somewhat 
homomorphic scheme, and then bootstrapping it to get a 
fully homomorphic scheme. Since then researchers have 
Figure 4: Data Security Lifecycle [20] 
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proposed variants and improvements to Gentry’s model. 
Smart and Vercauteren [43] presented a specialization of 
Gentry’s scheme which yielded a smaller ciphertext size. 
Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan [44] introduced 
the first variant of Gentry’s using arithmetic operations over 
integers. Stehle and Steinfield [45] also proposed a faster 
improvement of Gentry’s model. 
6. GENTRY’S FULLY HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION USING IDEAL LATTICES 
 An encryption scheme  has the following three 
step algorithm: 
1. KeyGen  - creates two keys i.e. the secret key sk 
and the public key pk. 
2. Encrypt  - encrypts the plaintext m with the public 
key pk to yield ciphertext c. 
3. Decrypt  - decrypts the ciphertext c with the 
secret key sk to retrieve the plaintext m. 
Gentry introduced a fourth step called Eval to the algorithm: 
4. Eval  - outputs a ciphertext c of f(m) such that 
Decrypt  (sk,m) = f(m). 
The scheme becomes homomorphic if f can be any arbitrary 
function, and the resulting ciphertext of Eval  is compact 
(i.e. it does not grow too large regardless of the complexity 
of function f). The Eval  algorithm in essence means that 
the scheme can evaluate its own decryption algorithm (i.e. 
the scheme is bootstrappable).  
 It can be shown that any arbitrary function is made 
up of an aggregate of addition, subtraction and 
multiplication functions (i.e. AND, OR and NOT gates). 
Gentry employed ideal lattices which provide additive and 
multiplicative homomorphism and low circuit complexities 
(for the decryption algorithm) in creating his fully 
homomorphic scheme. More on lattice based cryptography 
can be found in [42 - 40]. Further, in order to prevent the 
ciphertext (as well as the inherent noise/error) from 
becoming too large, Gentry introduced a Recrypt   function 
which refreshes a ciphertext  c’ to produce a new ciphertext 
c using a different key. Recrypt is a two-step procedure:  
1. Encrypt  (pk2, c1) to yield c1’, then  
2. output a new ciphertext c by Eval  (pk2, 
Decrypt , sk2’, c1’).  
 This is the process behind bootstrapping to yield 
the fully homomorphic encryption. 
7. VAN DIJK ET AL, FULLY
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION OVER THE
INTEGERS 
 A much more conceptually simple and true variant 
of Gentry’s scheme was proposed by van Dijk et al [44]. It 
follows Gentry’s method of starting with a somewhat 
homomorphic scheme, then bootstrapping to a fully 
homomorphic scheme. However, the scheme is conceptually 
simpler, employing simple addition and multiplication over 
integers. The algorithm is as given below: 
KeyGen  
? The secret key p, is an odd number 
Encrypt  - to encrypt a 1-bit message m 
? A large multiple of the secret key e.g. pq 
? A small even number e.g. 2r where r is the noise 
and r < p/4 or 2r < p/2 
? The ciphertext is c = pq + 2r + m 
Decrypt  - to decrypt ciphertext c 
? c = pq + 2r + m 
? c(mod p) = 2r + m(mod p) 
?  (c mod p) mod 2 = r + m, 
since the noise has the same parity as the message, 
simply read off the least significant bit (LSB) to retrieve 
the message. As long as the noise stays small, this can 
yield a fully homomorphic scheme – the onus is in 
proving that it supports additive and multiplicative 
homomorphism.
Given, c1 = pq1 + 2r1 + m1 ; c2 = pq2 + 2r2 + m2 
Additive Homomorphism implies:  
c1 + c2 = p(q1 + q2) + 2(r1 + r2) + m1 + m2
[(c1 + c2) mod p] mod 2,  
reading off the LSB gives us m1 + m2
Multiplicative Homomorphism:  
c1 . c2 = p.(c2q1 + c1q2 - q1q2) + 2.(r1r2 + r1m2 + r2m1) + m1m2 
[(c1 . c2) mod p] mod 2,  
reading off the LSB gives us m1m2  
 The main issue with both schemes above is the 
ciphertext and noise growth (especially w.r.t. function 
complexity). 
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8. AUGMENTING AN SHE SCHEME
WITH A MULTI-USER SEARCHABLE
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
 The main issue with the fully homomorphic 
schemes described above is the amount of time and 
computational resource required for their execution. What if 
we could assist the cloud in locating the information for 
computation while maintaining semantic security? 
Searchable Symmetric Encryption permits a user to 
selectively search the data that the user hosted in the cloud. 
Constructions and definitions can be found in [45, 46, 47]. 
 This paper proposes an encryption layer on top of 
the encrypted files to be stored on the cloud. This extra layer 
would be an encrypted search index layer, which can be 
searched by using secure indexes such as is discussed in 
[45]. Furthermore, Park et al described in [48] a method of 
secure index search for groups that can be used to allow a 
dynamic set of users search based on predefined access 
levels.  
 Searching the index will be possible only via a 
security token which could be generated for each 
search/computation. To prevent the server from learning the 
file content of each segment or what words are being 
searched by monitoring the user’s search pattern, the scheme 
has to be stochastic in nature. This also lends to a 
semantically secure system, as such, many tokens can be 
used to search for a single keyword. Each token would 
contain a timestamp, security credentials of the user, the 
index key and the next origin. The next origin is proposed to 
allow the index layer to be reset, as such, a different token 
would have to be generated to make a search for the same 
keyword. 
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